Mercer Law Review
Volume 61
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 3

12-2009

Administrative Law
Martin M. Wilson
Jennifer A. Blackburn

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wilson, Martin M. and Blackburn, Jennifer A. (2009) "Administrative Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 61 :
No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol61/iss1/3

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*
and Jennifer A. Blackburn*
I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Administrative procedure is rarely the topic of after-hours conversations, trailing far behind baseball scores, what to eat, and famous
personalities. However, the continuing creep of influence of administrative agencies impacts daily life far beyond casual observations. It is the
work of administrative agencies that propels government on all fronts.
This Article surveys chosen cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and
the Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2008 through May 31, 2009.1
Cases from specific subject areas that one would expect to see in other
articles contained in this volume have not been included unless points
regarding administrative law or procedures were especially important.
This Article first reviews cases concerning the "any evidence" rule and
then moves to exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Article then
shifts to the defenses posed by agencies once proceedings have begun.
Next, other standards for review of agency decisions are covered.
Finally, legislation affecting the various state agencies, as passed by the
Georgia General Assembly during its 2009 regular session, is noted.

* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1975); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., with honors, 1978).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (BA, 2000); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2004).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia administrative law during the prior survey period, see
Martin M. Wilson & Jennifer A. Blackburn, AdministrativeLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2008).
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THE "ANY EVIDENCE" RULE

In several cases decided during this year's survey period, the Georgia
Court of Appeals addressed the "any evidence" rule and put limits on a
court's discretion in reviewing such cases. In the first case, Glass v. City
of Atlanta,2 the court of appeals held that the any evidence standard is
applicable to the superior court's review of an Atlanta Civil Service
Board's decision.3 On appeal, the board's decision is to be "[vliewed in
a light most favorable to the Board, and with every presumption in favor
of the Board's decision indulged."4 Officer Stuart Glass, a member of
the Atlanta Police Department, was alleged to have used excessive force
following an altercation while on a routine patrol. After an internal
5
review, Glass was dismissed from the Atlanta Police Department.
Glass appealed his dismissal to the board. The board heard testimony
from the officers involved in the incident, a police academy instructor,
and the former police chief, who all testified that Glass's actions
constituted impermissible excessive force. In addition, the emergency
room physician who examined the victim also testified that the victim's
symptoms were consistent with the use of excessive force. The board
issued an order affirming Glass's dismissal. Thereafter, Glass appealed,
and the superior court affirmed the board's decision.6
Heard on discretionary appeal, the court of appeals determined that
"'[tihe appropriate standard of review to be applied to issues of fact on
writ of certiorari to the superior court is whether the decision below was
supported by any evidence.'" ' The court further explained that, on
appeal, "'our duty is not to review whether the record supports the
superior court's decision but whether the record supports the initial
decision of the local governing body or administrative agency.'" ' Glass
asserted that the evidence presented to the board was insufficient to
support the board's decision, "arguing that there was conflicting
testimony, that some of the testimony against him constituted hearsay,
and that some of the witnesses who testified against him were not

2.

293 Ga. App. 11, 666 S.E.2d 406 (2008).

3.

See id. at 13-14, 666 S.E.2d at 408-09.

4. Id. at 12, 666 S.E.2d at 407 (citing City of Atlanta v. Harper, 276 Ga. App. 460,461,
623 S.E.2d 553, 554 (2005)).
5. Id. at 12-13, 666 S.E.2d at 408.
6. Id. at 13, 666 S.E.2d at 408.
7. Id. at 13-14, 666 S.E.2d at 408-09 (quoting City of Atlanta Gov't v. Smith, 228 Ga.
App. 864, 865, 493 S.E.2d 51, 53 (1997)).

8.

Id. at 14, 666 S.E.2d at 409 (quoting Emory Univ. v. Levitas, 260 Ga. 894, 898, 401

S.E.2d 691, 695 (1991), overruled on othergrounds by Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty.
Health, 284 Ga. 158, 161 n.4, 664 S.E.2d 223, 226 n.4 (2008)).
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credible."9 Dismissing these arguments, the court clarified that "'[elven
evidence which barely meets the any evidence standard is sufficient, and
the presence of conflicting evidence nonetheless meets that standard.'" ° Accordingly, the court of appeals held there was sufficient
evidence to support the board's decision. 1
Glass also contended that the board violated his due process rights by
failing to conduct a hearing on the appeal within sixty days, pursuant
to former City of Atlanta Code of Ordinances § 5-3064(1),2 and by
failing to conduct the hearing on consecutive days. 3 In response, the
court distinguished between directory and mandatory statutory
provisions. 4 When there is no injury to the defendant and no penalty
provided in the statute, the provision is directory. Because the cited
provision provided no penalty for failure to comply, the statute was
directory, not mandatory. 6 In addition, Glass failed to cite any
provision in the ordinance that required the hearing to be held on
consecutive days. 7 Finally, Glass did not demonstrate that he was
harmed by the delay of his hearing.' While affirming the decision of
the superior court, the court of appeals reprimanded the superior court
for the twelve-year delay between Glass's appeal from the board's
decision and the hearing in superior court.' 9
In the next case decided during the survey period, Greene v. Department of Community Health,0 the court of appeals held that the any
evidence standard of review is not applicable to an internal agency
decision. 2' Anthony Greene appealed the termination of his medical
benefits by the Department of Community Health (DCH). An evidentiary hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who
affirmed the DCH's decision.2 2 Greene then appealed under section 49-

9. Id.
10. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Pruitt
Corp., 284 Ga. App. 888, 890, 645 S.E.2d 13, 15 (2007), rev'd, 284 Ga. 158, 664 S.E.2d 223

(2008)).
11. Id.
12.

ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5-3064(1) (repealed).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Glass, 293 Ga. App. at 14-15, 666 S.E.2d at 409.
Id. at 15, 666 S.E.2d at 409-10.
Id., 666 S.E.2d at 410.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16, 666 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at 18, 666 S.E.2d at 411.
293 Ga. App. 201, 666 S.E.2d 590 (2008).
Id. at 201, 666 S.E.2d at 591.
Id. at 201-02, 666 S.E.2d at 591.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

4-153(b)(1) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 2"
"which authorizes an aggrieved recipient of medical assistance to obtain
the [Georgia Insurance] Commissioner's review of a recommended
decision by an ALJ."2' In affirming the ALJ's decision, the commissioner relied on Commissioner of Insurance v. Stryker" for the proposition
that "findings of fact of the ALJ must be upheld unless they are not
supported by any evidence."" The superior court then affirmed the
commissioner's decision.27
The court of appeals clarified that while Stryker applies to the superior
court's review of an agency's decision, it does not apply to an agency's
review of an AL's recommendation." The AU's role is "to make a
recommendation, and if the aggrieved party challenges the recommendation, it is then up to the Commissioner... to 'affirm, modify, or reverse'" the AL's recommendation.29 By this process, it is the agency
head "that makes the ultimate decision as to how to resolve the
aggrieved party's claim."30 Because the commissioner applied an
incorrect standard of review, the court of appeals vacated the superior
court's holding and remanded the case for review under the proper
standard.3 1
The court warned that it in no way intended to indicate how the DCH
should rule after the case was remanded.3" Quoting from Glass v. City
of Atlanta,33 the court of appeals noted that in the context of judicial
review of an administrative decision, "'[nleither this Court nor the
superior court is authorized to substitute its judgment as to weight and
credibility of witnesses.'" 3' Furthermore, the court has no authority to
dictate a department's manner or standard of
review as long as the
35
department acts within its statutory authority.
The court of appeals further solidified the any evidence standard and
its application to a superior court's review of an agency decision in

23.
24.
25.

O.C.G.A. § 49-4-153(bXl) (2009).
Greene, 293 Ga. App. at 202, 666 S.E.2d at 591.
218 Ga. App. 716, 463 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

26.

Greene, 293 Ga. App. at 201, 666 S.E.2d at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted).

27.

Id.

28. Id. at 203, 666 S.E.2d at 592.
29.
30.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 49-4-153(b)(1)).
Id.

31.

Id. at 201, 666 S.E.2d at 591.

32.

Id. at 204, 666 S.E.2d at 593.

33.
34.

293 Ga. App. 11, 666 S.E.2d 406 (2008).
Greene, 293 Ga. App. at 204, 666 S.E.2d at 593 (alteration in original) (quoting

Glass, 293 Ga. App. at 14, 666 S.E.2d at 409).
35. Id. at 206, 666 S.E.2d at 594.
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Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County v. Georgia Public Service
Commission."6 The appeal arose "from a decision of the Georgia Public
Service Commission [(PSC)] to reduce the amount of municipal franchise
fees the Georgia Power Company [could] recover from its rate base.""
Following the PSC's decision, the Georgia Municipal Association (GMA)
filed a petition for judicial review and declaratory relief in the superior
court, which affirmed the PSC's decision.3" The GMA appealed, contending "that the PSC's decision was arbitrary and not supported by any
evidence." 9 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's decision,
holding that the GMA failed to show the superior court's decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. °
When reviewing a superior court's order in an administrative
proceeding, the appellate court is to determine "'whether the record
supports the final decision of the administrative agency."' 1 The court
must affirm "if any evidence on the record substantiates the administrative agency's findings of fact and conclusions of law." 42 Following
significant testimony from all parties, the PSC, noting its authority
under O.C.G.A. § 46-2-23(a)43 to determine "just and reasonable" rates
for electric service, modified the Georgia Power Company franchise fee
system." The court of appeals held that the evidence before the PSC
formed a sufficient basis for its decision to reallocate the franchise fees,
and the GMA failed to show that this decision was arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable.4 5
In Surgery Center, LLC v. Hughston Surgical Institute, LLC,46 the
court of appeals reigned in the superior court after determining that it
had exceeded its authority by substituting its own judgment for that of
an agency.47 The DCH denied a request by Hughston Surgical Institute, LLC (HSI) for a certificate of need to develop an orthopedic
ambulatory surgery center in Columbus, Georgia. The hearing officer

36. 293 Ga. App. 786, 668 S.E.2d 296 (2008).
37. Id. at 786, 668 S.E.2d at 297.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 790, 668 S.E.2d at 299.
41. Id. at 786, 668 S.E.2d at 297 (quoting Ga. Peace Officers Standards & Training
Council v. Anderson, 290 Ga. App. 91, 91, 658 S.E.2d 840, 841 (2008)).
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Profl Standards Comm'n v.
Alberson, 273 Ga. App. 1, 4, 614 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2005)).
43. O.C.G.A. § 46-2-23(a) (2004 & Supp. 2009).
44. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County, 293 Ga. App. at 787, 668 S.E.2d at 298.
45. Id. at 790, 668 S.E.2d at 299.
46. 293 Ga. App. 879, 668 S.E.2d 326 (2008).
47. Id. at 879, 668 S.E.2d at 327.
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and State Health Planning Review Board affirmed the denial of the
application.48

Subsequently, "HSI ...

appealed the Review Board's

decision to the superior court, which held that the [DCH] had abused its
discretion in denying HSI's application."49 The court of appeals reversed
the decision, reasoning that the superior court "improperly substituted
its own judgment for that of the [DCH]." 5 °
Because "'agencies provide a high level of expertise and an opportunity
for specialization unavailable in the judicial or legislative branches,'" the
court of appeals treated the review board's decision with deference as the
final decision of the DCH.51 Accordingly,
the superior court [could] reverse or modify the [DCH's] decision "only
if the appellant's substantial rights [had] been prejudiced because the
procedures used (1) violated constitutional or statutory provisions; (2)
exceeded the [DCH's] statutory authority; (3) were unlawful; (4) were
affected by legal error; (5) were not supported by substantial evidence;
or (6) were arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse or
unwarranted exercise of discretion."52
As previously established, the court of appeals reviews a superior
court's decision in an administrative proceeding by determining
"'whether the record supports the final decision of the administrative
agency."' 53 The DCH denied HSI's application after "finding that the
service area already had a surplus of operating rooms, that these
existing facilities were significantly underutilized, and that HSI had
failed to adequately [demonstrate] that the proposed project would
remedy an atypical barrier."14 Following an evidentiary hearing, the
hearing officer determined that the application did not satisfy the
atypical barrier provisions of the applicable regulations and affirmed the
DCH's denial. The review board also affirmed the denial.5 5
On appeal, the superior court reversed the review board's decision,
reasoning that it was "unsupported by any substantial evidence, an error
of law, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion."56 The court of appeals
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 350-51, 249 S.E.2d 38, 40 (1978)).
52. Id. at 880, 668 S.E.2d at 327-28 (quoting Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Satilla
Health Servs., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 880, 885, 598 S.E.2d 514, 518-19 (2004)).
53. Id., 668 S.E.2d at 328 (quoting Davis v. Brown, 274 Ga. App. 48, 50, 616 S.E.2d
826, 828 (2005)); see also supra text accompanying notes 8, 34-35.
54. Surgery Ctr., 293 Ga. App. at 881, 668 S.E.2d at 328 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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reversed the superior court's decision, holding that the superior court
exceeded its authority by substituting its judgment for that of the
DCH.57 Regardless of whether the court agreed with all of the hearing
officer's inferences and conclusions, "the Review Board was authorized
to conclude from the evidence ...

that HSI's application did not show

the existence of an 'atypical barrier' to orthopedic care in the service
area."58

HSI argued the application should be approved because the DCH had
approved similar applications in the past.5 9 The record demonstrated
that the hearing officer reviewed each of the similar decisions and
distinguished them on a variety of grounds; therefore, the court of
appeals would not substitute its judgment for that of the DCH. °
Because substantial evidence supported the DCH's denial of the
application, the court of appeals held that the superior court erred in its
reversal of the DCH's decision."'
In a special concurrence, Presiding Judge Blackburn objected to the
operation of the certificate-of-need system and the extensive control it
afforded the government.6 2 Concurring in the judgment only, Presiding
Judge Blackburn suggested that "[olur founding fathers never intended
that the government limit new businesses to those it felt were economically necessary.' 3
The court of appeals again upheld the any evidence standard as
applicable to the superior court's review of an agency decision in Jackson
64
Electric Membership Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission.
Jackson Electric Membership Corporation (Jackson EMC) appealed the
PSC's determination that Free Chapel Worship Center had chosen
Georgia Power Company as its electric service provider. Among other
enumerations of error, Jackson EMC argued that the "Request for
Electric Service" document presented by Georgia Power Company and
executed by Free Chapel did not constitute a valid contract under
Georgia law.65 The court of appeals, affirming both the superior court
and PSC decisions, determined that the request form constituted a
binding contract.66

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 879, 668 S.E.2d at 327.
Id. at 882, 668 S.E.2d at 329.
Id.
Id. at 882-83, 668 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 883, 668 S.E.2d at 329.
Id., 668 S.E.2d at 329-30 (Blackburn, P.J., concurring specially).
Id., 668 S.E.2d at 330.
294 Ga. App. 253, 668 S.E.2d 867 (2008).
Id. at 253-54, 668 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 254, 668 S.E.2d at 869.
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"'Under the [Georgia] Administrative Procedure Act,[67 ] an administrative agency's findings and conclusions may be reversed by the
superior court if they are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.'"' The
applicable standard of review provides that "'if any evidence on the
record substantiates the administrative agency's findings of fact and
conclusions of law,'" the decision must be upheld. 9 The appellate
court's "'duty is not to review whether the record supports the superior
court's decision but whether the record supports the final decision of the
administrative agency.'"7 °
Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer determined that
Georgia Power Company was the lawful supplier of electric service to
Free Chapel and ordered Jackson EMC to cease providing such services.
The PSC affirmed and adopted the hearing officer's decision, finding that
a valid contract existed between Georgia Power Company and Free
Chapel. On appeal, the superior court affirmed the PSC's decision.71
Applying the any evidence standard of review and holding that there
was sufficient evidence to support the PSC's findings, the court of
appeals upheld the superior court's decision.72
The superior court failed to apply the proper standard of review of an
agency decision in DeKalb County v. Bull,73 and the court of appeals
summarily reversed.7 4 Officer Evan Bull was terminated by the
DeKalb County Police Department following his involvement in a
domestic violence incident. The hearing officer affirmed the termination.
On appeal, the superior court reversed the hearing officer's decision and
reinstated Bull as a police officer. The police department appealed,
contending the superior court erred in reversing the decision of the
hearing officer and ordering Bull's reinstatement.75
Upon review of the police department's decision to terminate Bull, the
hearing officer determined that all the witnesses were credible, the
police department's investigation was solid, and the police department's
conclusions were reasonable. Based upon these findings, the hearing

67.

O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-1 to -44 (2009).

68. Jackson, 294 Ga. App. at 254, 668 S.E.2d at 869 (quoting Profl Standards Comm'n
v. Peterson, 284 Ga. App. 424, 427, 643 S.E.2d 899, 901 (2007)).
69. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Profl StandardsComm'n, 284 Ga. App. at 427,643

S.E.2d
70.
71.
72.
73.

at 901).
Id. (quoting Profl Standards Comm'n, 284 Ga. App. at 427, 643 S.E.2d at 901).
Id. at 257, 668 S.E.2d at 871.
Id.
295 Ga. App. 551, 672 S.E.2d 500 (2009).

74. Id. at 555-56, 672 S.E.2d at 503-04.
75. Id. at 551-52, 672 S.E.2d at 501.
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officer concluded that Bull failed to demonstrate that the police
department made an erroneous finding of fact and affirmed the
termination. Bull appealed to the superior court, arguing the hearing
officer's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.76
At the superior court hearing, "Bull contended that the police
department had made erroneous factual conclusions during its investigation of the altercation," that the hearing officer also made errors in
findings of fact upholding his termination, and that no evidence
supported the police department's determination that he was the initial
aggressor.77 In his testimony, Bull referred to events that occurred
after the hearing officer's review, "including his trial and acquittal on
the criminal charges arising from the altercation."7 8 Following the
hearing, the superior court issued an order stating that "the record was
'more complete' than it had been when the hearing officer issued her
ruling because of 'the facts that came out at trial,' including evidence of
the criminal verdict in favor of Bull."79 Finding that the hearing
officer's decision was erroneous in light of the substantial evidence on
the post-trial record, the superior court ordered the police department to
reinstate Bull and provide back pay from the day of termination. °
The court of appeals reversed the superior court's decision, holding
that the superior court applied an improper standard of review.8"
Applying the any evidence standard of review, the court determined that
the evidence presented to the hearing officer supported her decision. 2
"The superior court also erred in relying, at least in part, on the outcome
of Bull's criminal trial ...

[because] the criminal trial had not yet

occurred at the time of the [hearing officer's] decision."3 The court of
appeals held that "the outcome of the criminal trial was irrelevant to the
determination of whether the department properly terminated Bull's
employment."'
While the any evidence standard of review is applicable to the
appellate courts' review of an administrative decision, such standard of
review is not applicable to an internal agency appeal.'
In Georgia

76. Id. at 554, 672 S.E.2d at 502.
77. Id., 672 S.E.2d at 502-03.
78. Id., 672 S.E.2d at 503.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 555, 672 S.E.2d at 503.
81. See id.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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Department of Revenue v. Trawick ConstructionCo.," the commissioner
of the Georgia Department of Revenue issued an additional tax
assessment against Trawick Construction Company for the short tax
year of January 1, 1999 to October 1, 1999.87 Trawick appealed the
decision to the Office of State Administrative Hearings, and an AUJ
issued an initial decision "finding that Trawick demonstrated beyond a
preponderance of the evidence that the [commissioner's] assessment of
additional corporate Georgia income taxes on the proceeds of the
Thereafter, the
Trawick stock transfer [at issue] was erroneous."'
commissioner reversed the initial decision of the AL, and Trawick
petitioned for judicial review by the superior court. The superior court
reversed the commissioner's decision and reinstated the Al,'s initial
decision. 9 The court of appeals held that the superior court improperly
applied the any evidence standard to the review of the ALJ's decision
and thereby reversed the superior court and reinstated the commissioner's decision. 0
The any evidence standard of judicial review does not apply to the
ALJ's decision in an internal agency appeal.9 The court of appeals
explained,
[t]he AU's role at an administrative hearing is to act as the representative of the Department and to make a recommendation. "[Ilt is then
up to the Commissioner to either allow the recommendation to become
the Department's final decision (by taking no action), or to affirm,
modify, or reverse the decision appealed from."'
Because the commissioner's findings of fact were supported by some
evidence, "the superior court erred93 in rejecting such finding and adopting

the contrary finding of the

ALJ."

86. 296 Ga. App. 275, 674 S.E.2d 350 (2009), cert. granted. In granting certiorari, the
Georgia Supreme Court noted that it was "particularly concerned with the following issue
or issues: What are the Georgia corporate tax implications of an election under Internal
Revenue Code [(IRC)] § 338(h)(10) by the shareholders of a Federal sub-chapter S
corporation?" Supreme Court of Georgia 2009 Granted Certioraris, http://www.gasupreme.
us/granted_apps/granted-certs/gc_09.php#S09cl045 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
87. Trawick, 296 Ga. App. at 275, 674 S.E.2d at 352.
88. Id. at 275-76, 674 S.E.2d at 352 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
89. Id. at 276, 674 S.E.2d at 352-53.
90. Id. at 278-79, 674 S.E.2d at 354-55.
91. Id. at 278, 674 S.E.2d at 354.
92. Id. at 278-79, 674 S.E.2d at 354 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Greene, 293 Ga. App. at 203, 666 S.E.2d at 592).
93. Id. at 279, 674 S.E.2d at 355.
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In the final case in this section, City of LaGrange v. Georgia Public
Service Commission,9' the court of appeals further emphasized the
application of the any evidence standard in the appellate court's review
of an agency decision. Alleging a violation of the Georgia Territorial
Electric Service Act,95 the City of LaGrange filed a petition against
Diverse Power Incorporated (DPI) with the PSC.9" The Act "'establishes a plan whereby every geographic area within the state is assigned to
an electric supplier,'" and provides that "'lonce a service territory is
assigned, an electric supplier shall have the exclusive right to extend
and continue furnishing service to any new premises within that
area."'9 7 The city alleged that under these provisions, "DPI was not
authorized to provide electric service to the Troup County High School
ball field or [auditorium] because both properties were within the City's
exclusive service territory." 98
Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer determined that
DPI was authorized to provide electricity to the ball field and auditorium. The city filed an application for review and the commission adopted
the hearing officer's decision." In its decision, the commission relied
on O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(a),"0 ° "which allows a consumer to choose an
electric supplier different from the assigned supplier where service is
furnished to one or more new premises."'
On appeal, the superior
02
court affirmed the decision of the commission.
When reviewing a superior court order in an administrative proceeding, the court of appeals must determine "'whether the record supports
the final decision of the administrative agency. [The court] will affirm
if any evidence on the record substantiates the administrative agency's
findings of fact and conclusions of law.'"'1 3 Deference is given to the
factual findings of an agency.' Those findings will be rejected "'only
if they are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record; or arbitrary or capricious or

94. 296 Ga. App. 615, 675 S.E.2d 525 (2009).
95. O.C.G.A §§ 46-3-1 to -15 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
96. City of LaGrange, 296 Ga. App. at 615, 675 S.E.2d at 526.
97. Id. at 615-16, 675 S.E.2d at 527 (quoting Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ga.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 273 Ga. 702, 703, 544 S.E.2d 158, 160 (2001)).
98. Id. at 616, 675 S.E.2d at 527.
99. Id.
100. O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(a) (2004).
101. City of LaGrange, 296 Ga. App. at 619, 675 S.E.2d at 529.
102. Id. at 616, 675 S.E.2d at 527.
103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke
County, 293 Ga. App. at 786, 668 S.E.2d at 297).
104. Id.
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characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion. '""
The court of appeals determined "that the Commission's findings and
conclusions [were] supported by the evidence in the record and [were]
not contrary to or in excess of the Commission's statutory authority.
Furthermore, [the court did] not find that the Commission's decision was
arbitrary or capricious or that it constituted an abuse of discretion."" 6
Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the superior court's decision
10 7
in favor of the commission.
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The appellate courts have stringently upheld a plaintiff's obligation to
exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing an action with the
courts. The cases in this year's survey provide little relief to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the first case, Northeast GeorgiaCancer Care,LLC v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc.," Northeast Georgia Cancer Care filed a
lawsuit against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia,
seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging claims of breach of legal
duty, tortious interference with business relations, and unfair trade
practices. Pursuant to these claims, Northeast challenge[d] Blue
Cross's refusal to allow Northeast and its medical oncologists to
participate as an approved health care provider for Blue Cross's HMO
network.'
Northeast claimed that Georgia's Any Willing Provider statute, O.C.G.A.
§ 33-20-16,11° "mandate[d] that Northeast and its medical oncologists
be allowed to participate as providers in the Blue Cross HMO network
under the same terms and conditions offered to other participating
physicians.""'
The trial court granted Blue Cross's motion to dismiss. 2 The court
of appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court to dismiss Northeast
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies." 3 Under O.C.G.A.

105. Id. (quoting Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 263 Ga. App. 711,712,
589 S.E.2d 292, 294 (2003)).

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 620-21, 675 S.E.2d at 530.
Id. at 621, 675 S.E.2d at 530.
297 Ga. App. 28, 676 S.E.2d 428 (2009).
Id. at 28-29, 676 S.E.2d at 430.

110. O.C.GA § 33-20-16 (2000).
111. Ne. Ga. Cancer Care, 297 Ga. App. at 30, 676 S.E.2d at 431.

112. Id.
113. Id.
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13

§ 33-20-30,114 which provides "the procedure for resolving disputes
arising from the alleged violation of statutes regulating insurance health
care plans"115 under the Health Care Plan Act," 6 Northeast was first
required to submit its dispute to the insurance commissioner."7
Northeast argued that "Blue Cross waived the exhaustion issue by
failing to assert it as a defense in the answer to the complaint."" 8
That position proved incorrect because "[tihe failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is not designated as an affirmative defense or
a defense that is waived if not presented in the answer to the complaint."" 9 Moreover, the record reflected that Blue Cross timely raised
the issue with the superior court, the superior court ruled on the issue,
and Blue Cross again raised the issue on appeal. 2 ' Accordingly, the
court of appeals acknowledged there was no waiver. 2' The court
proceeded to reprimand Northeast for attempting to "bypass the
mandatory administrative procedures by attempting to present its claim
under the guise of a tort action seeking the recovery of damages." 2 2
In Diverse Power Inc. v. Jackson,"2 the supreme court affirmed the
superior court's dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 24 Arising from a request for a proposal to solicit
competitive bids for electrical services for a training center, Diverse
Power sued the Department of Technical and Adult Education (DTAE),
Ronald W. Jackson-the Commissioner of the DTAE, and Georgia Power
Company, seeking to enjoin performance of the contract between Georgia
Power Company and the DTAE and to have the contract awarded to
Diverse Power."2 The trial court dismissed the action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies before seeking equitable relief from the
court. 126

In a case of first impression, the supreme court granted Diverse
Power's petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether the Georgia

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

O.C.G.A. § 33-20-30 (2000).
Ne. Ga. Cancer Care, 297 Ga. App. at 30, 676 S.E.2d at 431.
O.C.G.A. §§ 33-20-1 to -34 (2000).
Ne. Ga. Cancer Care, 297 Ga. App. at 31, 676 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 32, 676 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. (citing O.C.GA. §§ 9-11-8(c), -12(h)(1) (2006)).

120. Id.

121. Id.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 32-33, 676 S.E.2d at 432.
285 Ga. 340, 676 S.E.2d 204 (2009).
Id. at 341, 676 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 340-41, 676 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 341, 676 S.E.2d at 205.
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Vendor Manual (GVM) 12 7 or the State Purchasing Act (SPA) 28 required the exhaustion of administrative remedies.' 29 Diverse Power
argued it was not required to exhaust its available administrative
remedies because the General Assembly did not include an express
exhaustion requirement in the SPA.130 However, the General Assembly, through the SPA, "expressly gave the Department of Administrative
Services the authority to 'make all rules, regulations, and stipulations
and to provide specifications to carry out the terms and provisions of [the
SPA] as may be necessary for the purposes of [the SPA].'"'3 1 The GVM
sets forth the rules, regulations, and stipulations to further the purposes
of the SPA, and the GVM includes mandatory protest procedures.' 32
Accordingly,
an expressed exhaustion provision in the SPA was not
133
required.

When an administrative remedy exists, long-standing Georgia law
requires an aggrieved party to exhaust all available administrative
remedies before seeking judicial review of the agency's decision."
Because Diverse Power failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies before seeking equitable relief, the supreme135court affirmed the
superior court's dismissal of Diverse Power's claim.
The final case discussed in this section, City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com,
L.P,136 is revisited from last year's article. 37 Here, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals and carved out a unique exception to
the generally broad doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 138 This case presented an interesting twist on the normal usage
of the exhaustion of administrative remedies defense. While generally
used by governmental entities when litigants resort to court filings too
quickly, here the roles were reversed. The City of Atlanta was seeking

127.

STATE PURCHASING DIV., DEP'T OF ADMIN. SERVS., GEORGIA VENDOR MANUAL

(2009) [hereinafter GVM], available at http'//doas.ga.gov/stateloca/spd/docs-spd-general/
georgiavendormanual.pdf.
128. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-5-50 to -146 (2009).
129. Diverse Power, 285 Ga. at 341, 676 S.E.2d at 205.
130.

Id.

131. Id., 676 S.E.2d at 206 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-5-54).
132. Id.; see also GVM § 3.8(1)(bXi).
133. Diverse Power, 285 Ga. at 341, 676 S.E.2d at 206.
134. Id. at 342, 676 S.E.2d at 206.
135. Id. at 342-43, 676 S.E.2d at 206.
136. 285 Ga. 231, 674 S.E.2d 898 (2009).
137. See generally Martin M. Wilson & Jennifer A. Blackburn, Administrative Law,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1, 8 (2008) (discussing the court of
appeals decision in City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, L.P., 288 Ga. App. 391, 654 S.E.2d 166
(2007), rev'd, 285 Ga. 231, 674 S.E.2d 898 (2009)).
138. See Hotels.com, 285 Ga. at 233, 674 S.E.2d at 900.
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to collect hotel occupancy taxes against seventeen travel companies that
operated on the internet.139 Instead of making any tax estimates and
delivering tax assessments to the companies, the city brought an action
in superior court. In response, the companies moved to dismiss, arguing
that the city had not exhausted its "administrative remedies" by
following the normal tax assessment, collection, and appeals procedures.
The motion to dismiss was successful, and the city appealed. 4 °
The court of appeals upheld the dismissal based on a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction due to the city's failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies.'
Specifically, the court of appeals determined that (1) the city was required to provide written notice of taxes
due prior to filing suit for recovery under the city's Hotel or Motel
Occupancy Tax Ordinance 4 2 and (2) "the City was not excused from
the exhaustion requirement under the theory that pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile or result in irreparable harm."'
The
supreme court vacated the court of appeals decision, holding that "until
the threshold legal issue of applicability of the hotel tax ordinance has
been resolved, the City should not be required to submit to the
administrative process" provided within the ordinance.'
The threshold issue was whether the hotel tax ordinance applied and
was absolutely determinative of the city's authority over the companies
for tax purposes.'4 5 Because there was still a "bona fide dispute over
the applicability of the [hotel tax] ordinance, the City's rights and obligations thereunder [had] not sufficiently 'accrued' so as to preclude
declaratory relief."' 46 Accordingly, the supreme court vacated the court
of appeals decision and remanded to allow adjudication of the city's
declaratory judgment claim as to the applicability of the hotel tax
ordinance. 4 v In a rather scathing dissent, Justice Melton asserted
that, "without supporting authority, without any compelling reason, and
contrary to prior precedent, the majority wrongly refuse[d] to determine
that the City's collection claims [were] procedurally and fatally
flawed." 4 '

139.
140.
141.
142.
2009).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 231-32 & n.1, 674 S.E.2d at 899 & n.1.
Id. at 233, 674 S.E.2d at 900.
Id.
ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 146-76 to -89 (Municode through Aug. 25,
Hotels.com, 285 Ga. at 233, 674 S.E.2d at 900.
Id.
Id. at 234, 674 S.E.2d at 901.
Id. at 235, 674 S.E.2d at 901.
Id. at 237, 674 S.E.2d at 902.

148. Id. at 240, 674 S.E.2d at 905 (Melton, J., dissenting).
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IV. AGENCY DEFENSES

The Georgia appellate courts decided an unusually high number of
cases during the survey period that dealt with the Georgia Open Records
Act "4' 9 and agency defenses. The first case was Unified Government of
5
Athens-Clarke County v. Athens Newspapers, LLC."'
Athens Newspapers, LLC sent a request to the Unified Government of Athens-Clarke
County asking for investigation records for an unsolved case from
1992.161 The request was later denied based on a statutory exemption
for investigations and prosecutions that are "pending."1 2 The paper
filed an action in court, seeking the records, attorney fees, and litigation
expenses for tardiness because the request was not acted upon within
three business days. The thrust of the argument presented by the paper
was that the criminal investigation had been pending without activity
for about thirteen years, so it could no longer be classified as "pend53
ing."1
The trial court ruled in favor of the county on both matters through
a summary judgment order. The paper appealed to the court of appeals,
which reversed only part of the trial court's ruling. The court's opinion
was that a pending investigation and a pending prosecution (the other
item exempted in the relevant statutory paragraph) should have
consistent interpretations. Therefore, when applying elements from
prior pending prosecution cases, the court reasoned that the long period
of inactivity of the criminal investigation meant that it was no longer
pending. Regarding the tardy response to the request, the court felt that
delivery to a particular custodian should not be the point at which the
measurement of time commenced; rather, delivery to the agency itself
should suffice.' 5'
Obviously, the county was not exactly elated by the ruling, so an
application for writ of certiorari was made to the supreme court.65
The supreme court felt that the court of appeals engaged in flawed
reasoning by comparing a pending investigation to a pending prosecution.' 6 Instead, it recognized that there are criminal cases that may

149. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2009).
150. 284 Ga. 192, 663 S.E.2d 248 (2008).
151. Id. at 192, 663 S.E.2d at 249.
152.

Id. at 193; see O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(aX4).

153. Athens Newspapers, 284 Ga. at 193, 663 S.E.2d at 249.
154. See id.; see also Athens Newspapers, LLC v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke
County, 284 Ga. App. 465,643 S.E.2d 774 (2007), rev'd, 284 Ga. 192,663 S.E.2d 248 (2008).
155. See Athens Newspapers, 284 Ga. at 193, 663 S.E.2d at 249.
156. See id. at 195-96, 663 S.E.2d at 250-51.
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remain unsolved forever and many more that may take a long time to
bring to a close.157 Reviewing legislative amendments to the relevant
provisions of the Open Records Act, the court concluded that it was
without the necessary power to substitute its ruling for that of the law
enforcement organization as to when an investigation should be
considered closed. 158
As to the three-day response time, the supreme court and the court of
appeals apparently felt the same about the matter.'59 Neither court
thought a records request should have to be actually received by an
employee with the job of holding custody of the records, even though the
direct statutory reference mentions an "individual.""e The better way
of measurement would be from the date the request was delivered to the
agency.16 1 Thus, the supreme court affirmed that part of the court of
appeals ruling.' 62
Then-Presiding Justice Hunstein concurred in part and dissented in
part, and then-Chief Justice Sears and Justice Thompson joined her
opinion."e Basically, the supreme court had repeatedly pronounced
that the public policy was to encourage the dissemination of as much
information as possible.' 6 ' Literally handing over the power to declare
when a criminal investigation is no longer pending to law enforcement
'cy.'
officials was perceived as greatly at odds with that po
A somewhat simpler issue-whether trade secrets of a state contractor
can be protected from production by the relevant state agency-was
presented in United HealthCare of Georgia, Inc. v. Georgia Department
of Community Health."' United HealthCare, Inc. procured a contract
with the DCH to administer the functional details of the health benefit
plan for state employees. Part of the services involved maintaining a
network of health care providers through contractual obligations." 7
A group of doctors, later followed into the matter by the Medical
Association of Georgia, made a request for all the contract information
held by United and by DCH. United told DCH that it did not want the
documents produced, but DCH, interpreting its own responsibilities, was

157. Id. at 196-97, 663 S.E.2d at 251.
158. See id. at 197-98, 663 S.E.2d at 252.
159. See id. at 198-99, 663 S.E.2d at 252-53.
160. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(f).
161. Athens Newspapers, 284 Ga. at 199, 663 S.E.2d at 253.

162. Id.
163. Id. (Hunstein, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164.

See id. at 199-200, 663 S.E.2d at 253.

165. See id. at 203-04, 663 S.E.2d at 256.
166.

293 Ga. App. 84, 666 S.E.2d 472 (2008).

167. Id. at 84-85, 666 S.E.2d at 474-75.
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prepared to do so. Accordingly, United filed in superior court for
injunctive relief, asking that DCH be enjoined from making the
disclosures. The doctors intervened and argued in favor of the production of the documents. The interveners and DCH obtained a summary
judgment declaring that both the documents in possession of DCH and
in the possession of United were public documents, and none could be
termed as trade secrets. United appealed to the court of appeals.1"
Two issues were determined in the ensuing decision. First, because
a portion of the documents sought were actually in its possession, United
argued that the Open Records Act should not apply."6 9 Citing both the
contract in place between United and DCH and provisions of the Open
Records Act, the court "conclude[d] that, as a matter of law, the [United
documents were] received or maintained by [United] 'in the performance
of a service or function for or on behalf of an agency,' .

.

. and thus

constitute[d] public records under the Open Records Act."17 °
Second, regarding trade secrets, the court reversed the determination
initially made below. 71 The trial court ruled that documents obtained
from United could not be covered through any trade secrets exemption
found in the Open Records Act because there was no requirement for the
documents to be submitted to DCH. 17 2 The court of appeals determined that ruling was nonsensical, and it read the trade secret
exemption to mean that public documents would be treated as trade
secrets if they met the test set forth under applicable trade secret
provisions.173 United had not waived its rights to retain trade secrets
by signing the contract with DCH that contained a provision stating that
DCH would disclose documents under the Open Records Act if the
documents were subject to its provisions." Accordingly, accompanying the reversal, the case was remanded for the trial court to apply the
appropriate tests to ascertain whether the documents United sought to
protect were indeed trade secrets.175
The time requirements for a response by an agency under the Open
1 76
Records Act was the core issue in Jaraysi v. City of Marietta.
Waleed Jaraysi owned an unfinished building for which the City of

168. Id. at 85-86, 666 S.E.2d at 475-76.
169. Id. at 87, 666 S.E.2d at 476.
170. Id. at 89, 666 S.E.2d at 478 (citation omitted) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(a)).
171. Id. at 89, 93, 666 S.E.2d at 478, 480.
172. Id. at 90, 666 S.E.2d at 478.
173. Id. The trade secret statutes are found in the Georgia Trade Secrets Act of 1990.
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (2009).
174. United HealthCare,293 Ga. App. at 91-92, 666 S.E.2d at 479.
175. Id. at 93, 666 S.E.2d at 480.
176. 294 Ga. App. 6, 668 S.E.2d 446 (2008).
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Marietta had initiated a criminal-type demolition action in the municipal
court. Jaraysi made an open records request for basically all documents
on file that were related to the construction of the building. No response
was given to Jaraysi by the city until almost a month later when an
because the
attorney for the city said the request would not be honored
17
parallel municipal court matter was criminal in nature.
Jaraysi responded with an action in superior court to make the city
comply with the Open Records Act. After a short period of discovery, the
city moved for summary judgment. The city argued for the first time in
that motion that the records sought by Jaraysi were exempt under the
Open Records Act provision regarding pending investigations or
The trial court ruled in
prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity.
178
favor of the City and Jaraysi appealed.
Reversing the court below, the court of appeals ruled that the city
could not use the exemption raised in the trial court as a basis to retain
the records because it had not done so by notifying Jaraysi in writing
within the three-business-day response period of the Open Records
Act. 1 79 The court of appeals also remanded the case for a consideration
of whether the city, by violating the Open Records Act, would be liable
for costs and attorney fees incurred by Jaraysi.8 0
In Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority v. Miller & Billips,'8 ' the court
of appeals held that the attorney work product doctrine failed to protect
the agency involved. 2 The Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority assigned one of its attorneys from the in-house office to look into some
anonymous complaints alleging employee misconduct. The attorney
talked to various persons, made tape recordings and notes, and
summarized the work with a report to the in-house general counsel.
Later, attorney Matthew Billips served the authority with a request for
all of the work product of the investigation. The authority basically
denied the bulk of the request, citing the work as attorney work product.
An action in superior court was filed, and the judge held a hearing and
inspected the records in camera. The superior court ruled that the
attorney work product doctrine did not apply and that the materials
should have been disclosed.'

177.
178.
72(a)(4).
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 7, 668 S.E.2d at 447-48.
Id. at 7-8, 668 S.E.2d at 448. Concerning the exemption, see O.C.G.A. § 50-18Jaraysi, 294 Ga. App. at 8, 668 S.E.2d at 448.
Id. at 11-12, 668 S.E.2d at 451.
293 Ga. App. 601, 667 S.E.2d 455 (2008).
Id. at 603, 667 S.E.2d at 457-58.
Id. at 601-02, 667 S.E.2d at 456.
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The authority appealed to the court of appeals in an effort to prevent
disclosure."M The court first held that the review of the trial court's
order would be confined to see if an abuse of discretion had occurred
because a trial court possesses discretion to decide whether the Open
Records Act protection applies and also possesses discretion on whether
the attorney work product doctrine applies. 1"
The trial court had ruled that the records protected by the authority
did not fall under the attorney work product doctrine for two reasons.
Not only had the authority initiated its investigation based upon some
number of anonymous complaints about the conduct of employees, but
there had been no actual claims and no litigation as a result. 186
Accordingly, there was no8 basis
to find an abuse of discretion, and the
7
affirmed.
was
court
lower
The authority was back in court regarding matters pertaining to a
hospital services manual in Georgia Department of Community Health
M At issue was
v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority."
the use by the
DCH of revisions to its manual to retroactively evaluate cost reports.
The authority, on behalf of a division of Grady Health System known as
the Hughes Spaulding Children's Hospital, argued in the administrative
arena that the DCH's retroactive application of the manual provisions
to the cost reports was unlawful. After losing the administrative case
through the final agency decision of the DCH commissioner, the hospital
appealed to superior court."8 9 The agency decision was reversed as "an
unconstitional retroactive application" of the later revisions of the
hospital services manual, and the DCH filed a discretionary appeal. 90
The court of appeals took little interest in the DCH's argument that
the hospital had not exhausted its administrative remedies or correctly
presented the issue for the first time in the administrative proceeding.'9 1 The appellate court held, to the contrary, that the hospital had
raised the issue in the administrative proceeding but was merely
challenging the legal arguments advanced to support the DCH's
contention in superior court.'9 2 Regarding the substance of whether
the manual revisions were applied in an unconstitutional manner, the
court affirmed that the DCH was bound under contract to use the

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 602, 667 S.E.2d at 456.
Id., 667 S.E.2d at 456-57.
Id. at 603-04, 667 S.E.2d at 457-58.
Id. at 604, 667 S.E.2d at 458.
294 Ga. App. 431, 669 S.E.2d 233 (2008).
Id. at 431-32, 669 S.E.2d at 233-34.
Id. at 432-33, 669 S.E.2d at 234-35.
See id. at 433, 436, 669 S.E.2d at 235, 237.
Id. at 436, 669 S.E.2d at 237.
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payment methodology in effect on the date the hospital rendered
services."'
V. OTHER STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS
Both the any evidence rule and agency deference constituted a part of
the decision in Handel v. Powell."" James Powell was a candidate for
one of the district seats on the Georgia Public Service Commission, and
the secretary of state challenged his qualifications on the basis of
residence. An ALJ found in favor of Powell, enumerating several
positive considerations from the set of criteria specified under applicable
law. The secretary of state, who reversed the decision of the ALJ,cited
only one failure to abide correctly according to the criteria-namely, that
Powell had a homestead exemption on property located outside the
district borders.'9 5
Powell appealed to superior court, and the decision was reversed. The
court found that the use of the homestead exemption, by itself, could not
support the decision against Powell.' 96 The secretary of state appealed
to the supreme court, which affirmed.197 Foremost among the arguments maintained by the secretary of state was that the superior court
should have affirmed because there was evidence to support the decision
against Powell. 9 ' Drawing analogies between the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act" and election provisions,2 "° and citing Pruitt
Corp. v. Georgia Department of Community Health,2 " 1 the court stated
that "judicial review of an administrative decision does not end with the
20 2
determination that the findings of fact have evidentiary support."
The secretary of state further argued that the court should have
deferred to the interpretation given to the list of criteria that the
secretary had used. 0 3 That proposal was erroneous and, according to

193. Id. at 436-37, 669 S.E.2d at 237.
194. 284 Ga. 550, 670 S.E.2d 62 (2008).
195. Id. at 550-51, 670 S.E.2d at 63-64.
196. Id. at 551-52, 670 S.E.2d at 64.

197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 555, 670 S.E.2d at 66.
Id. at 552, 670 S.E.2d at 64.
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-1 to -44 (2009).
The court commented that the standard of review under the election code

provision, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-5(e) (2008), was basically the same as the standard under the
Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h). Handel, 284 Ga.at 552,

670 S.E.2d at 64-65.
201. 284 Ga. 158, 664 S.E.2d 223 (2008). This case is also discussed later in this
Article. See infra text accompanying notes 217-26.
202. Handel, 284 Ga.at 552-53, 670 S.E.2d at 64-65.

203. Id. at 553, 670 S.E.2d at 65.
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the supreme court, the judiciary independently determines whether an
interpretation of the statutory framework is correct.2 4 Because the
secretary of state used only one of the criteria that was negative to
Powell when there were seven or more out of the list likely in Powell's
favor, the supreme court affirmed the superior court's ruling.0 5
"[Slubstantial rights of the candidate [had] been prejudiced because the
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the Secretary of State
violate[d] a Georgia law or [were] affected by other error of law."20 6
Agency deference favored the DCH in the case of Georgia Department
of Community Health v. Medders. °7 Gracie Medders lost her husband
in November 2002 and was the beneficiary under his will. However, she
renounced any interest under the will in May 2003.208 Before what is
known as the "look-back period" passed (at that time, three years from
the date of the husband's death), Medders sought Medicaid benefits for
payment of nursing home bills.2" DCH denied the benefits because
the inheritance had been renounced, and Medders sought review by an
ALJ. The ALJ affirmed the denial, and Medders appealed to the
superior court.2 10
The superior court reversed the DCH decision on the ground that the
renunciation had the effect of erasing any rights that existed under the
will. Accordingly, there could be no penalties to attach to Medders
because she had no assets to dispose of or transfer during the look-back
period.21'
Upon appeal by DCH, however, the court of appeals determined that
deference was appropriate for the interpretation of Medicaid requirements by DCH.212 Rules governing wills and estates were not necessarily the same as rules governing Medicaid claimants who renounce
property or assets to which they have become entitled.1 3
There were two other errors in the case that were corrected. The ALJ
had found particular amounts of financial resources that Medders had

204. Id. (citing Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 273 Ga. 702,
706, 544 S.E.2d 158, 162 (2001)).
205. Id. at 554, 670 S.E.2d at 66.
206. Id. at 553, 670 S.E.2d at 65.
207. 292 Ga. App. 439, 664 S.E.2d 832 (2008).
208. Id. at 439-40, 664 S.E.2d at 833.
209. Id. at 440-41, 664 S.E.2d at 833-34.
210. Id. at 440, 664 S.E.2d at 833. No final agency decision was needed because DCH
took no further steps for thirty days, allowing the decision to become final under O.C.G.A.
§ 49-4-153(b)(1) (2009). Medders, 292 Ga. App. at 440, 664 S.E.2d at 833.
211. Medders, 292 Ga. App. at 441-42, 664 S.E.2d at 834.
212. Id. at 442, 664 S.E.2d at 834.
213. Id.
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renounced, but the record did not support that finding. 214 This was
important to Medders because the penalties imposed by Medicaid were
to be calculated against benefits that would otherwise be paid.21
Further, the superior court found the May 2003 renunciation to relate
back to the date of the death of Medders's husband; but, consistent with
the court of appeals determination that inheritance statutes did not
apply, the court of appeals deemed that the later date upon which the
renunciation had been filed would prevail for purposes of Medicaid.2 1
A mistaken application of agency deference by the court of appeals
was corrected in Pruitt Corp. v. Georgia Department of Community
Health.2 17 Pruitt Corporation owned nursing homes and accepted
Medicaid reimbursements under a contract with the DCH. A dispute
arose over the meaning of terms in the DCH policies and procedures
manual, such as last approved cost report. The terms of the
manual
21 8
were incorporated into the contract between DCH and Pruitt.

The court of appeals noted that the final decision from the agency, in
this case the commissioner of the DCH, was entitled to deference
because there had been evidence to support the decision. 9 However,
the supreme court held that judicial deference was not appropriate
because the subject matter was a policies and procedures manual, and
not a statute or regulation.22 ° In fact, there should have been no
deference whatsoever because what the court was essentially doing was
interpreting a contract between Pruitt and DCH.221 The correct
analysis should have involved rules for contracts.2 22
The supreme court also determined that an analysis of the DCH
decision must involve more than just a finding that there was evidence
to support the decision.223 The court explained that O.C.G.A. § 50-1319(h)224 requires a reviewing court "to examine the soundness of the
conclusions of law drawn from the findings of fact supported by any
evidence, and [the court] is authorized to reverse or modify the agency
decision upon a determination that the agency's application of the law

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 442-43, 664 S.E.2d at 835.
Id.
Id. at 443-44, 664 S.E.2d at 835-36.
284 Ga. 158, 664 S.E.2d 223 (2008).
Id. at 158, 664 S.E.2d at 224.
Id. at 159, 664 S.E.2d at 225.
Id. at 160, 664 S.E.2d at 225.
See id., 664 S.E.2d at 226.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h).
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to the facts is erroneous." 225 Thus, the decision from the court of
226
appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded.
One normally does not think of the attorney general's office as a
regulatory agency, but it was in Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Baker.227
Georgia has laws regarding the implementation of historic tobacco
settlement agreements.22
If a manufacturer was not part of the
agreements and wishes to sell cigarettes in Georgia, there must be a
submission to the attorney general that payment has been made into an
escrow fund.22 9 The attorney general keeps the list of compliant
manufacturers and all of their cigarette brands. 23 If the brand is not
on the list, it cannot be sold.231
Carolina Tobacco Company did not actually manufacture the brand of
cigarettes it sold. However, it took charge from the manufacturing step
onward, and it owned the intellectual property rights to the brand.
During the time of this outsourcing, the attorney general gave notice to
Carolina of his intent to remove a Carolina brand from the directory
because Carolina was not a manufacturer. Carolina had paid the escrow
fund amounts in its own name with no involvement from the actual
manufacturer. Carolina appealed to an ALJ, who found an ambiguity
in the governing statute regarding the use of the term manufacturer,
and the ALJ extended the meaning of the term to cover Carolina.2 32
As the court of appeals aptly put it, the attorney general "appealed the
decision to himself."233 Apparently applying the definition given to
tobacco product manufacturer in the governing statute,2 34 the attorney
general ruled that there was no ambiguity in legislative intent and
reversed the decision of the ALJ.2 35 The superior court affirmed the
attorney general, and Carolina applied for discretionary review in the
court of appeals. 3 6
Reviewing the text of the statute and applying ordinary meanings to
the term manufacturer, the appellate court had no problem agreeing

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Pruitt, 284 Ga. at 161, 664 S.E.2d at 226.
Id.
295 Ga. App. 115, 670 S.E.2d 811 (2008).
See O.C.G.A. ch. 10-13, 10-13A (2009).
Carolina, 295 Ga. App. at 117, 670 S.E.2d at 812-13.
Id., 670 S.E.2d at 813.
Id.
Id. at 116-18, 670 S.E.2d at 812-13.
Id. at 118, 670 S.E.2d at 813.
O.C.G.A. § 10-13-2(9)(A).
Carolina,295 Ga.App. at 118, 670 S.E.2d at 813.
Id.
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with the attorney general and the superior court."'7 Additionally, the
attorney general had assigned an interpretive definition to the term
tobacco product manufacturer through an agency regulation, 8 and
judicial deference to the interpretation of the agency charged with
enforcing the regulatory framework was deemed appropriate.239
Although the court affirmed the attorney general's decision to remove
the cigarette brand from the sales list during the period in which
Carolina subcontracted the manufacturing, the court reversed the lower
decisions through which the attorney general had determined that he
had no discretion to add the cigarette brand to the list after Carolina
took over.2'
Citing directly to the governing statute on the point,
O.C.G.A. § 10-13A-4(b), 2" the court determined there was discretion
to put the brand name into the directory if any violations, such as the
failure of the actual manufacturer to make proper reports and payments,
had been cured." 2 The case was remanded on that point for the
superior court to instruct the attorney general to give considerations
accordingly."
In Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission,24 the
court of appeals applied only limited deference to the agency. The issue
in the case was exactly when territorial rights for electricity suppliers
accrued.2 45 Statewide legislation in 1973 empowered the PSC to
allocate different areas of the state to electricity suppliers. 246 Besides
territories for the suppliers, a supplier could receive "corridor rights" to
service customers within 500 feet of transmission lines owned by the
supplier.2' 7
At the time of the original enactment and subsequent assignment of
territories, Georgia Power was the geographic area supplier and also
owned transmission lines with 500 feet of certain office buildings.
Georgia Power sold the transmission lines in 1982. Through further
transactions, the interest in the transmission lines devolved to Sumter
Electric Membership Corporation. For the transaction in question,
Sumter had been requested by business owners in the subject office

237.
238.
239.

See id. at 119-20, 670 S.E.2d at 814-15.
See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 60-1-1.03(9) (2004).
Carolina, 295 Ga. App. at 120-21, 670 S.E.2d at 815.

240. Id. at 124, 670 S.E.2d at 817.
241.

O.C.G.A. § 10-13A-4(b).

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Carolina, 295 Ga. App. at 124, 670 S.E.2d at 817.
Id.
296 Ga. App. 556, 675 S.E.2d 294 (2009).
See id. at 556-57, 675 S.E.2d at 295-96.
Id. at 557, 675 S.E.2d at 295-96 (citing O.C.GA § 46-3-4 (2004)).

247.

Id. at 558-59, 675 S.E.2d at 297 (citing O.C.G.A. § 46-3-4(4)).
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buildings to supply electricity. Of course, Georgia Power resisted and
sought relief from the PSC. The hearing officer and, subsequently, the
PSC ruled that Sumter had a corridor right because of its ownership of
the transmission lines. In turn, the superior court upheld the decision
of the PSC, and Georgia Power appealed to the court of appeals."45
Citing Handel v. Powell, 9 the court of appeals stated that "although
[it] generally defer[s] to the PSC's interpretation" of the Georgia
Territorial Electric Service Act, 20 "that deference is not absolute." 5 '
Concentrating its analysis on the background of the statutory framework, the court held that only an initial assignment for geographic areas
and transmission line corridors were within the purview of the
legislation. 2 Any interest acquired after the initial assignments
would not change the law and would not bring about reassignment.25 3
Thus, the judgment was reversed."
The court of appeals decision in Fulton County Boardof Tax Assessors
v. National Biscuit Co.255 involved an erroneous interpretation of tax
appeal procedures. The Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors appraised
property at a value far higher than what the National Biscuit Company
believed it to be. The appraisal was appealed to the board of equalization, which lowered it somewhat, but nowhere near the value that
National Biscuit obtained from an outside appraiser. Accordingly,
National Biscuit appealed to superior court. The judgment of the
superior court was that a value higher than that of the board of
equalization's findings was shown, but that a lower amount found earlier
by the board of equalization provided the upper limit because the tax
assessors had not filed their own appeal in the matter.2" 6 In other
words, deference was shown to the decision of the board of equalization.257
On appeal by the tax assessors to the court of appeals, the superior
court was reversed.258 Citing the applicable statute on property tax

248. Id. at 557, 675 S.E.2d at 296.
249. 284 Ga. 550, 670 S.E.2d 62 (2008). This case is discussed earlier in this Article.
See supra text accompanying notes 194-206.
250. O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-1 to -15 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
251. Ga. Power, 296 Ga. App. at 559, 675 S.E.2d at 297.

252. Id. at 560, 675 S.E.2d at 298.
253. See id. at 560-61, 675 S.E.2d at 298.
254. Id. at 561, 675 S.E.2d at 298.
255. 296 Ga. App. 884, 676 S.E.2d 41 (2009).

256. Id. at 884, 676 S.E.2d at 42.
257. See id. at 884-85, 676 S.E.2d at 42-43.
258. Id. at 884, 676 S.E.2d at 42.
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appeals259 and expressly disapproving dicta from a prior case," the
court held that "a tax appeal requires a trial de novo, regardless of
which party files the appeal, and that the superior court is not bound by
any of the board of equalization's prior findings."26 '
In the last case in this section, McKelvey v. Georgia Judicial Retirement System,262 the court of appeals deferred to an agency interpretation regarding the amount of retirement pay.2"s Howard McKelvey
was a member of the Georgia Judicial Retirement System (JRS) by
virtue of his position as a state court solicitor. In addition to a monthly
salary, the governing county authority paid for administrative expenses
and some level of benefits. The administrative expenses were reimbursed because the county had no office space for McKelvey to use,
apparently finding it more economical for McKelvey simply to use his
own law office. The amounts for administrative reimbursements and for
benefits were never listed as income to McKelvey by the county, and
neither the county nor McKelvey made contributions to the JRS on those
amounts.2"
When it was time to retire, McKelvey claimed that his monthly
retirement income should be based upon the total compensation he had
received, not just the salary amounts.2 "s The JRS disagreed, and
McKelvey took the matter to superior court. When the superior court
agreed with the JRS,266 the matter was taken by McKelvey to the
court of appeals.267
The statutory framework governing the JRS provided somewhat
convoluted interpretations to be afforded the terms salary and compensation.2 " However, the court of appeals readily understood why the JRS
used only the salary amount that had been paid to McKelvey and found
ample reasons to defer to the JRS decision to exclude fringe benefits or
reimbursements that were not reported to tax officials as income to
McKelvey. 269 Of particular note, the employer and employee contributions to JRS had been based solely on the salary amounts and nothing

259. Id., 676 S.E.2d at 42-43 (citing O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(3) (2009)).
260. Id. at 886, 676 S.E.2d at 43-44 (citing Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors v.
Ackerman/Indian Trail Ass'n, 198 Ga. App. 723, 725, 402 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1991)).
261. Id., 676 S.E.2d at 44.
262. 297 Ga. App. 650, 678 S.E.2d 120 (2009).
263. See id. at 654-55, 678 S.E.2d at 123-24.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 651-53, 678 S.E.2d at 121-22.
Id. at 653, 678 S.E.2d at 122.
Id. at 651, 678 S.E.2d at 121.
Id. at 653, 678 S.E.2d at 123.
See id. at 653-54, 678 S.E.2d at 122-23.
See id. at 654, 678 S.E.2d at 123.
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else.27 ° In such an instance, the appellate court stated that "the
administrator's interpretation and application of the retirement plan law
is not contradicted by the undisputed evidence or by the law's plain
language and purpose in this case."27 1
VI.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Likely owing to the condition of the state economy and the strapped
state budget, the General Assembly made few momentous changes in
state agencies during the 2009 regular session. Mostly, it was all
shuffling and adjustments. The following are the highlights:
(1) The Agricultural Commodity Commission for Ornamental Plants
was created. 2 2
(2) The Georgia Aviation Authority will now oversee state aircraft
and related activities, supplanting prior work performed by the
Department of Transportation.2 73
(3) The Georgia Retiree Health Benefit Fund has been replaced by
the Georgia School Personnel Post-employment Health Benefit Fund and
the Georgia State Employees Post-employment Health Benefit Fund,
with a type of administrative delegation for their operations given to the
Department of Community Health.274
(4) The State Ethics Commission has received changes in its powers
and duties, along with a more specific authorization for the promulgation
of regulations.275
(5) In a major reshuffling, functions of the Department of Community
Health and Department of Human Resources have been split among a
Department of Community Health, a Department of Human Services,
and a Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities.
There is also a statutory new state officer called the State Health
Officer, a new Advisory Council for Public Health, and a Public Health
Commission.276

270. Id. at 653, 678 S.E.2d at 122.
271. Id. at 654, 678 S.E.2d at 123.
272. Ga. S. Bill 152, § 4, Reg. Seas., 2009 Ga. Laws 446 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 2-813(aO4) (Supp. 2009)).
273. Ga. S. Bill 85, §§ 1-3, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 848 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 6-5-1
to -10 (Supp. 2009)) (repealing O.C.G-.A §§ 50-19-20 to -26 (2009)).
274. Ga. S. Bill 122, §§ 1-3, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 49 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2874 to -879, 45-18-24 to -28 (Supp. 2009)) (repealing O.C.G.A. §§ 45-18-100 to -105) (Supp.
2009)).
275. Ga. S. Bill 168, § 1, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 620 (amending O.C.GA. § 21-5-6
(2008 & Supp. 2009)).
276. Ga. H.R. Bill 228, §§ 1-1 to 3-27, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 453 (amending
scattered sections of O.C.G.A. tits. 31, 37, 49 (2009 & Supp. 2009)).
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(6) There is now a statutorily created planning division and director

for the Department of Transportation.277

(7) Many areas of health care services provisions will now be under
the authority of the newly created Georgia Composite Medical Board.
Primarily affected are physicians, acupuncturists, physician assistants,
certain cancer and glaucoma treatments, certain respiratory care,
clinical perfussionists, orthotics, and prosthetics.278

(8) In a referenced name change, the State Merit System of Personnel
Administration becomes the State Personnel Administration. 79
(9) The Department of Administrative Services has transferred to the
various councils of judges certain retirement fund-related duties.'

277. Ga. S. Bill 200, §§ 1-13, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 976 (amending scattered
sections of O.C.G.A. tit. 32 (2009)).
278. Ga. H.R. Bill 509, §§ 1-16, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 859 (amending scattered
sections of O.C.G.A., primarily O.C.GA. ch. 43-34 (Supp. 2009)).
279. Ga. S. Bill 98, § 1, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 752 (amending scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tit. 47 (Supp. 2009)).
280. Ga. S. Bill 109, §§ 1-20, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 753 (amending scattered
sections of O.C.G.A. tit. 47 (Supp. 2009)).
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